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As we know,
There are known knowns.
There are things we know we know.
We also know
There are known unknowns.
That is to say
We know there are some things
We do not know.
But there also unknown unknowns,
The ones we don't know we don't know.
1
-Donald H. Rumsfeld

I. INTRODUCTION
The protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union (AUPSC Protocol) will likely come into force in 2004 and will serve as
the continent's first continent-wide, regional, collective security system. 2 It
also will form a vital part of the African regional human rights system. The
AUPSC joins the Economic Community of West African States Mechanism on
Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, Peace-Keeping and
Security (ECOWAS Mechanism) and the South African Development
Community Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (SADC
Organ) as one of three African mechanisms established to manage conflict
through military intervention. 3
The AUPSC will operationalize and provide structure and an
enforcement mechanism for several Organization of African Unity (OAU)
decisions, declarations, and conventions related to peace, security, stability,
and development including:

I DONALD H. RUMSFELD, The Unknown, in PIECES OF INTELLIGENCE: THE EXISTENTIAL POETRY
OF DONALD H. RUMSFELD (Hart Seely ed., 2003).

See Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union (July 9, 2002), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON CONSTITUTIVE, CONFLICT

2

AND SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN,

AND JUDICIAL ISSUES 161

(Jeremy I. Levitt ed., 2003)

[hereinafter African Peace Protocol].
3 See Protocol Establishing the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and
Resolution, Peace-Keeping, and Security (Dec. 10, 1999), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED
DOCUMENTS ON CONSTITUTIVE, CONFLICT AND SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN, AND JUDICIAL ISSUES

259 (Jeremy I. Levitt ed., 2003) [hereinafter ECOWAS Protocol]; Southern African Development

Community (SADC) Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (Aug. 14, 2001),
reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON CONSTITUTIVE, CONFLICT AND SECURITY,
HUMANITARIAN, AND JUDICIAL ISSUES 309 (Jeremy I. Levitt ed., 2003) [hereinafter SADC
Protocol].
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" Declaration on the Establishment of the OAU of a Mechanism for
4
Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (MCPMR);
" Decisions AHG/Dec.141 (XXXV) and AHG/Dec.142
5
Unconstitutional Removal of Governments;

(XXXV)

on

" Declaration AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI) on the Framework for an OAU
6
Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government;
" Declaration AHG/Decl.4 (XXXVI) on the Conference on Security,
Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA);7
" The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD);8 and
" Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. 9
The AUPSC Protocol was endorsed on July 9, 2002 at the First Ordinary
Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Durban, South Africa. 10 It
was adopted, pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African
Union (Constitutive Act)," "as a standing decision-making organ for the
prevention, management and resolution of conflicts" and to serve as "a

4Declarationof the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment of the OAU
of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (June 30, 1993), reprinted
in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON CONSTITUTIVE, CONFLICT AND SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN,
AND JUDICIAL ISSUES 219 (Jeremy I. Levitt ed., 2003) [hereinafter Establishment of the OAU].
5 Decisions on Unconstitutional Changes of Government, AHG/Dec.141 (XXXV Sess.) and
AHG/Decl.142 (XXXV Sess.) (July 12-14, 1999).
6 Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of
Government, AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI Sess.) (July 10-12, 2000).
7 Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
(CSSDCA), AHG/Decl.4 (XXXVI Sess.) (July 10-12, 2000).
8 The New Partnership for African Development, Oct. 2001, available at http://www.dfa.gov.za/
events/nepad.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2003) [hereinafter NEPAD]. See also, Declaration on the
New Africa Initiative, AHG/Decl.1 (XXXVII Sess.) (July 9-11, 2001), available at
http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/summit councillahg.pdf (last visited July 10, 2003). The New
Africa Initiative was later termed the New Partnership for African Development. See NEPAD,
supra.
9 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (July 12-14 1999), reprinted in
AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON CONSTITUTIVE,

CONFLICT AND SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN,

AND JUDICIAL ISSUES 187 (Jeremy I. Levitt ed., 2003) [hereinafter Convention on Terrorism].
10 To date, South Africa, Algeria, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Mozambique, Libya,
Malawi, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Ghana, the Sudan, and Rwanda have deposited their
instruments of ratification of the AUPSC Protocol. Decision of the Operationalizationof the
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, Decisions of the
Assembly of the AU, (II Sess.) (July 10-12, 2003), available at http://www.africaunion.org/officialdocuments/DecisionsDeclarations/Assembly%/20AU%2Dec%2016%20II.pdf
Oast visited Sept. 2, 2003).
11Article 5(2) empowers the AU to establish "[o]ther organs that the Assembly may decide to
establish." Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, OAU Doc. No. CAB/LEG/23.15
(entered into
force
May
26, 2001),
available at
http://www.africa-union.org/
AboutAU/ConstitutiveAct.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Constitutive Act].
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collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and
efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa." 12 The AUPSC
Protocol will codify, provide structure to, and operationalize key provisions in
the Constitutive Act, including:
" Article 3(f): concerned with promoting "peace, security, and stability on
13
the continent;"
" Article 4(h): concerning the right of the AU to "intervene in a Member
State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity;" 14 and
" Article 40): concerning the right of the member states of the AU to
''request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and
security."15
The AUPSC Protocol will also reinforce the AU's New Partnership for
Africa's Development (NEPAD) Peace and Security and Democracy and
Political Governance initiatives,1 6 particularly its pledge to "manage all
aspects of conflict" through, among other things, "peacemaking, peacekeeping
and peace enforcement." Under Article 22 of the AUPSC Protocol, the AUPSC
will replace the Cairo Declaration and supersede the resolutions and
decisions of the Central Organ of the Organization of African Unity
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (OAU
MCPMR) and affiliated centers 1 7 Upon entry into force, the AUPSC Protocol
will significantly impact the AU's role in conflict prevention, management,
and resolution by, among other things, conferring on it peacemaking powers
unknown to its predecessor; hence, it is necessary to begin considering its
effect.
Historically, African states have lacked the political will and capacity to
manage interstate and intrastate conflict. This was particularly the case with
the OAU, the continent's foremost political organization composed of nearly
all African states. As Robert Rotberg notes, civilian-led governments seem to
lack "sufficiently strong political will in Africa, either at the OAU or the
subregional levels, to direct the generals and their soldiers" to enforce
peace. 18 The most audacious interventions have been at the behest of strongmen heads of state-leaders who thoroughly commanded the body politic,
12African Peace Protocol,supra note 2, art. 2(1), at 166.
13Constitutive Act, supra note 11, art. 3(f).
14 Id. art. 4(h).
15Id. art. 4(j).
16NEPAD, supra note 8.
17See African Peace Protocol,supra note 2, art. 22, at 183.

18 Robert I. Rotberg, African Responses to African Crises: Creating a Military Response, in
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT IN AFRICA 109 (Robert I. Rotberg et al. eds., 2000).
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whether through popular democracy or autocracy. Former Tanzanian
president Julius Nyerere's toppling of Idi Amin's oppressive regime in
Uganda in 1979 and the bold interventions of former Nigerian head of state
General Sani Abacha in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990 and 1997,19
respectively, are cases in point. The lack of political will and a viable and
effective continent-wide peace and security system has meant that many
small and preventable conflicts have escalated into full-blown protracted ones
with serious regional consequences. From the Mano River region in West
Africa to the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa, the last two decades reveal a
pattern of brutal and unfettered warfare within and between states. 20 While
the key patron states and transnational corporations of the Cold War have
stimulated, manipulated, exacerbated, and exploited African conflict for
geopolitical and economic gain, African elites generally lacked the political
will to adopt concrete measures to prevent and resolve long-standing conflict.
The OAU, for its part, did not possess the political mandate, resolve, or
resources to manage conflict. On this point, Rotberg notes that the "OAU has
had no effective early warning or early action capacity; nor has it had any
21
military capability."
This article examines how African states chose to evolve the AU regional
collective security system. Particular attention is devoted to the concept of
conflict management through military intervention in the AUPSC Protocol
and relevant constitutive acts of African regional organizations. The first
section analyzes key provisions of the Protocol. The second section
contemplates the impact of the Protocol once it enters into force and the main
stumbling blocks that will need to be addressed, including trans-regional
conflicts of law. The third, concluding section suggests ways to strengthen the
enforcement aims of the AUPSC within the context of the current African
system.
II. KEY PROVISIONS IN THE PROTOCOL
It is essential to examine the text of the Protocol in order to appraise its
efficacy in Africa's current legal, sociopolitical, and economic environment.
Since it is newly adopted and it will be some time before AU leaders consider
adopting another security framework, 22 it is important to reflect on the
19Jeremy Levitt, HumanitarianIntervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Case
of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 333 (1998) [hereinafter
Humanitarian Intervention]. See also Jeremy Levitt, African Interventionist States and
InternationalLaw, in AFRICAN INTERVENTIONIST STATES: THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION BROKERS

(Oliver Furley & Roy May eds., 2001) [hereinafter African Interventionist States].
20 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Causes of Conflict and the
Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, A/52/871-S/1998/318 (LII
Sess.) (Apr. 13, 1998), available at http://unbisnet.un.org (last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
21Rotberg, supra note 18, at 101.
22The signatories of the AUPSC Protocol are legally bound by the treaty and must refrain from
any action that defeats its object and purpose. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in
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character of the AUPSC, which has been charged with ensuring peace,
security, and stability in a continent of nearly one billion people. This section
highlights and examines the central objectives, composition, functions,
powers, procedures, and organs of the AUPSC. Before key provisions of the
Protocol can be discussed, we must first consider its relationship to the OAU
MCPMR.
A. The RelationshipBetween the OA U MCPMR and the A UPSC
Paragraph 4 of the Preamble to the AUPSC Protocol states that pursuant
to a decision of the 37th Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of
State and Government in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 2001, the Assembly
"decided to incorporate the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for
Conflict, Prevention, Management, and Resolution as one of the organs of the
Union, in accordance with Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African
Union." 23 Article 5(2) empowers the AU Assembly to establish organs as it
deems necessary. 24 It follows that paragraph 4 also "requested the [OAU]
Secretary-General to undertake a review of the structures, procedures and
working methods of the Central Organ [of the OAU MCPMR], including the
possibility of changing its name." 25 Thereafter, the OAU Secretary-General
produced a report titled Background Document on the Review Structures,
Procedures and Working Methods of the Central Organ (Background Report)
that served as the conceptual foundation for the creation of the AUPSC
26
Protocol.
The Background Report draws on the experiences of the OAU MCPMR in
conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy in, for example, Uganda
and Rwanda (2001), the Central African Republic (2001-present), C6te
d'Ivoire (2000-present), the Comoros (1997-2001), Sierra Leone (1996-1999),
and Liberia (1990-1997).27 It is also informed by the MCPMR's conflict
resolution activities through peace negotiations and agreement monitoring,
to various types of observation missions in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (1998-present), Rwanda (1993-1994), Burundi (1993-2001), and
Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2001).28 Given the OAU Assembly's reluctance to
engage in conflict management through peace enforcement or intervention,
there is limited experience from which to draw lessons. The Background
BASIC DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS, arts. 12(1)(b-c),

18(a), at 88, 90 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 3ded. 1993) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
23 African Peace Protocol,supra note 2, pmbl., at 163.
24Constitutive Act, supra note 11, art. 5(2).
25 Id.
26Organization of African Unity, Background Document on the Review Structures, Procedures
and Working Methods of the Central Organ 1-42 (2002) (unpublished document, on file with
author) [hereinafter OAU Background Document].
27 Id. at 7-17.
2

8 Id.
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Report implies that the Assembly erred when, in founding the MCPMR, it
concluded that the "emphasis of the OAU Mechanism on anticipatory and
preventive measures and concerted action on peacemaking and peacebuilding would obviate the need to resort to complex and resource-demanding
peacekeeping operations, which African countries could find difficult to
finance and carry out."29 The OAU Secretary-General's report recommended
that, given the failure of the United Nations (U.N.) to forestall African
conflict and the bold intervention provisions in the AU Constitutive Act, "the
mandate of the Mechanism be enlarged to provide for the deployment of
peacekeeping forces and peace-enforcement in circumstances provided in
Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union." 30
Rather than simply incorporate the MCPMR into the AU as originally
decided by the 37th Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly, one year later
the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union adopted a
completely new framework in the Protocol establishing the AUPSC. Although
the AUPSC Protocol was heavily informed by the recommendations in the
Background Report, it was far more liberal than the latter on the issue of
intervention or peace enforcement, largely due to the broad powers conferred
on the Assembly to enforce peace under Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive
Act. Upon entering into force, the AUPSC Protocol will "replace the Cairo
Declaration" and "supercede the resolutions and decisions of the OAU
relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and
Resolution in Africa, which are in conflict with the present Protocol."31 Let us
now consider the normative aspects of the AUPSC Protocol.
B. AUPSC Objectives, Composition, and Functions
1. Objectives
The objectives of the AUPSC are not new to the African political
landscape. They complement those in Article 3 of the AU Constitutive Act 32
and echo the collective security framework proffered in the Draft Kampala
Document for the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and
Cooperation in Africa in 1991. 33 As stated, the AUPSC Protocol was
29 Id.

at 4.

Id. at 39. Article 4(h) empowers the AU with the "right to intervene in a Member State
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity." Constitutive Act, supra note 11, art. 4(h)-(j). Article 4(j)
sanctions 'Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and
security." Id.
31 African Peace Protocol,supra note 2, art. 22, at 183.
30

32 See Const itutive Act, supra note 11, art. 3.
3 Draft Kampala Document for a Proposed Conference on Security, Stability, Development and
Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) (May 22, 1991), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON
CONSTITUTIVE, CONFLICT AND SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN, AND JUDICIAL ISSUES 227 (Jeremy I.
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established to be a permanent decision-making, collective security, and earlywarning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict
and other crises in Africa. 34 Its key objectives are to "promote peace, security
and stability;". "guarantee the protection and preservation of life and
property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well
35
as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development;
"anticipate and prevent conflicts;" 36 "promote and implement peace-building
and post-conflict reconstruction activities; 37 "co-ordinate and harmonize
continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international
terrorism;" 38 "develop a common defence policy; '39 and "promote and
encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect
human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human
life and international humanitarian law." 40 These objectives are indeed
grand, given the questionable record of its predecessor, general lack of
resources of AU member states, and the acute security challenges facing the
continent. In order for the AUPSC to have any semblance of success, African
states will need to make realistic commitments about the amount of human
and tangible resources needed to "endow" it.
2. Composition
The composition of the AUPSC is not wholly unique. In some ways it
emulates the structure of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),
particularly on issues concerning membership, core functions, and voting.
This may be, in part, because the AU relied on UNSC staffers as advisers
during the drafting of the Protocol. Notwithstanding, the AUPSC is more
democratic than its U.N. counterpart as it does not provide for permanent
41
membership or for any veto power. All decisions will be made by consensus.
Hence, no member state will be able to deadlock the activities of the AUPSC.
Similar to the UNSC, the AUPSC is composed of fifteen members who will
serve two and three-year terms. 42 AUPSC members will be "elected on the
basis of equal rights" and according to the "principle of equitable regional
representation and rotation." 43 Prospective members are elected according to
Levitt ed., 2003) [hereinafter CSSDCA].
34African Peace Protocol,supra note 2, art. 2, at 166.
35Id. art. 3(a).
36

Id. art. 3(b).

31Id. art. 3(c).
38

Id. art. 3(d).

39African Peace Protocol,supra note 2, art. 3(e), at 166.
40

Id. art. 3(f), at 167.

41

Id. art. 8(13), at 172.

42

Id. art. 5(1), at 167.

43Id. art. 5(1)-(2), at 168-69.
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numerous criteria, including their ability and willingness to uphold, promote,
financially support, advocate the principles of the Union, 44 and actively
participate in subregional and regional peace-making and peace support
operations. 45 Respect for the rule of law, in particular constitutional
governance structures, and for human rights are also key criteria for
membership. 46 How the "respect for the rule of law" criterion may be
quantified in legal terms 47 and, if international standards are the means of
measurement, how many African states genuinely would be entitled to AU
membership are questions that cannot be answered at this time.
3. Functions
The AUPSC is empowered to carry out several important functions that
complement and contradict the other security mechanisms in Africa,48
including the ECOWAS Mechanism, the SADC Protocol, and the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) conflict mechanism. 49 The
key function of the AUPSC is to "promote peace, security and stability in
Africa." 50 It envisages doing this through early warning, preventive
diplomacy, 51 mediation, 52 and, perhaps more importantly, peace support
54
operations, intervention,53 humanitarian action, disaster management,
5
5
"peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction," and "any other function as
may be decided by the Assembly." 56 While these functions are indeed
important, neither the Constitutive Act nor the AUPSC Protocol defines what
these terms mean from an operational or policy standpoint. Nevertheless, it
is clear that the AUPSC may employ force in multiple contexts, whether to
thwart conflict and safeguard human rights, to ensure access to
humanitarian agencies, or to deliver humanitarian relief during natural
14African Peace Protocol, supra note 2, art. 5(2)(a)-(c), (e), (j), at 167-68.
45Id. art. 5(2)(d)-(e).
46Id. art. 5(2)(g).
47[d.

48 See discussion of these differences infra Part III.
49There is no provision in the IGAD Mechanism for peacekeeping or peace enforcement. Protocol
on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Member States, reprintedin AFRICA: SELECTED
DOCUMENTS ON CONSTITUTIVE, CONFLICT AND SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN, AND JUDICIAL ISSUES

333 (Jeremy I. Levitt ed., 2003) [hereinafter Protocolfor the IGAD].
50African Peace Protocol,supra note 2, art. 6(a), at 168.
51 Id. art. 6(b).

52 Id. art. 6(c).
53Id. art. 6(d).

Id.art. 6(0.
55African Peace Protocol,supra note 2, art. 6(e), at 168.
5Id. art. 6(f).

TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 13:109

disasters. 57 The next section provides insight into the proposed operational
and policy activities of the AUPSC.
C. Powers, Procedures,and Organs
1. Powers
The AUPSC Protocol sets forth eighteen major "powers" or
responsibilities of the organization. These powers cover the gamut of
peacemaking activities, from policy oversight and quality control
responsibilities to full-fledged military intervention. Military intervention
includes preemptively engaging states that have policies that may lead to
genocide and crimes against humanity, 58 authorizing nonmilitary peacesupport missions, 59 and recommending to the AU Assembly military
intervention pursuant to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act in respect of
grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity. 60 Furthermore, the AUPSC will be charged with, among other
things, instituting "sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of
62
Government takes place;" 6 1 "implementing a common defense policy;"
63
combating terrorism in accordance with the OAU terrorism convention; and
coordinating and cooperating with subregional and regional mechanismsincluding the U.N.-particularly on peace and security issues. 64 AU member
states are bound by the decisions and actions of the AUPSC and "shall extend
full cooperation to, and facilitate action by the Peace and Security Council for
65
the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts."
The powers of the AUPSC are more clearly defined than those
enumerated in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. In fact, the AUPSC sets out
clear bases on which intervention may take place and creates a positive duty
to institute sanctions whenever there are unconstitutional changes of
government. 66 From this background, it is quite clear that the functions and
powers of the AUPSC were informed by Africa's pressing security challenges

57

Id.

58 Id. art. 7(1)(a), at 169.
59

Id. art. 7(1)Co).

6o

Constitutive Act, supra note 11, art. 4(h).

61

African Peace Protocol, supra note 2, art. 7(1)(g), at 169.

63

Id. art. 7(1)(h).
Id. art. 7(1)(i).

6

Id. art. 7(1)(k), at 169.

65

Id. art. 7(2)-(4).

62

66African Peace Protocol, supra note 2, art. 7(1)(g), at 168.
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and the fact that African leaders established the AUPSC to deal with any and
all security issues, whether man-made or acts of God.
2. Procedures
The AUPSC will meet at the headquarters of the Union in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia. 67 If a member state invites the AUPSC to meet in its country, that
state will defray the additional costs incurred by the AU Commission as a
result of holding the meeting away from headquarters. 6 3 It will convene "as
often as required at the level of Permanent Representatives, but at least
twice a month." 69 Ministers and heads of state of government will meet at
least once a year.7 0 The chairmanship of the AUPSC will rotate annually
among its members. 71 AUPSC meetings will be closed, and any member state
that is party to a dispute being considered by the Council may "not
participate either in the discussion or in the decision making process"
relating to the dispute. 72 At least two-thirds of the total AUPSC membership
is required to constitute a quorum. 73 Since the AUPSC is not yet in force,
there exist no rules of procedure to guide the convening of meetings, conduct
of business, or other aspects of its work. However, Article 8(14) requires that
it "submit its own rules of procedure . . .for consideration and approval by
74
the Assembly" once the AUPSC becomes operative.
The AUPSC may hold open meetings where a non-AUPSC member state
at conflict or party to a situation under Council review "shall be invited to
present its case as appropriate and shall participate, without the right to
vote, in the discussion."75 States not at conflict or under review of the AUPSC
may be invited to participate in discussions "whenever that Member State
considers that its interests are especially affected." 76 International
organizations, regional organizations and mechanisms, and civil society
entities party to or interested in a situation under review of the AUPSC may
be invited to participate as nonvoting observers. 77 Furthermore, the AUPSC
may hold "informal consultations" for any and all interested or affected

67Id. art. 8(3), at 170.
68Id. art. 8(4), at 170-71.
69Id. art. 8(2), at 170.
70 /q-

71African Peace Protocol, supra note 2, art. 8(6), at 171.
72Any party to a dispute may be invited to present its case to the AUPSC.
73African Peace Protocol, supra note 2, art. 8(8), at 171.
74Id. art. 8(14), at 172.
75Id. art. 8(10)(a), at 171-72.
76 Id. art. 8(10)(b).

77Id. art. 8(10)(c).
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parties to a situation under its consideration. 78 The Protocol provides civil
society institutions a venue in which to participate directly or to weigh in on
matters being considered by the Council. 79 Furthermore, Article 20,
"Relations with Civil Society Organizations," commits the AUPSC to
"encourage" non-governmental organizations and all other forms of
community-based entities, particularly "women's organizations, to participate
actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in
Africa."80 This is a significant development considering the state-centric,
gender-biased, and elitist characteristics of its predecessor, the OAU Central
Organ/MCPMR, particularly on peace and security issues. If civil society
entities are permitted to participate in discussions before the AUPSC,
African people will have an opportunity to influence and be informed about
the policy prescriptions of their governments on critical security issues
affecting them.
3. Organs
The AUPSC Protocol provides for the establishment of three noteworthy
operational organs: the Panel of the Wise (Panel), the Continental Early
Warning System (CEWS), and the African Standby Force (ASF). The Panel
will advise and support the "efforts of the Peace and Security Council and
those of the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of
conflict prevention" (including preventive diplomacy and mobilizing public
opinion) and on "all issues pertaining to the promotion, and maintenance of
peace, security and stability in Africa." 81 It will be composed of five eminent
African personalities who have made an "outstanding contribution to the
cause of peace, security and development on the continent."8 2 Panel members
will be "selected by the Chairperson of the Commission" upon consultation
with the "Member States concerned, on the basis of regional representation
and appointed by the Assembly" for three-year terms.8 3 The Panel will
"report" to the AUPSC and through it to the AU Assembly.8 4 If the Panel is to
be a viable mechanism in assisting the AUPSC to avert conflict, its members
must be viewed as impartial and must be respected and trusted by all
segments of African society. The character of the AUPSC also will impact the
way in which parties at conflict regard the Panel.

78

African Peace Protocol,supra note 2, art. 8(11), at 171-72.

79Id. art. 8(10)(c), (11).
80 Id. art. 20, at 182.
81Id. art. 11(1), (3), (4), at 174.
82

Id. art. 11(2), at 174.

83African Peace Protocol, supra note 2, art. 11(2), at 174.
84 Id. art. 11(5), at 174-75.
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The CEWS is an appendage of the OAU MCPMR and will be integrated
into the AUPSC. It will consist of an "observation and monitoring center"
that will be referred to as the "Situation Room," which will be responsible for
data collection and analysis.85 It is envisaged that the CEWS will be linked to
subregional conflict mechanisms including the ECOWAS Mechanism, the
SADC Organ, and the IGAD conflict mechanism. The CEWS will supply the
Commission (AU Secretariat) with timely information and analysis "to advise
the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace"
86
and recommend courses of action with the purpose of taking early action.
The ASF is arguably the most important organ in the AUPSC framework.
It will be a rapid deployment force "composed of standby multidisciplinary
contingents, with civilian and military components."87 AU member states will
be responsible for establishing standby contingents for AUPSC peace support
operations and intervention. 8 It is sanctioned to conduct several types of
operations including:
89
1. [O]bservation and monitoring missions;
2.
3.

4.

5.
6.

[O]ther types of peace support missions; 90
[I]ntervention in a member state in respect of grave
circumstances or at the request of a member state in order to
restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h)
and (j) of the Constitutive Act; 91
[P]reventive deployment in order to prevent (i) a dispute or a
conflict from escalating, (ii) an ongoing violent conflict from
spreading to neighboring areas or states, and (iii) the
resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached
92
an agreement;
[Pleace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and
93
demobilization;
[H]umanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of
civilian populations in conflict areas and support efforts to
address major natural disasters; 94 and

85Id. art. 12(2)(a), at 175.
86Id. art. 12(5)-(6), at 175-76.
87Id. art. 13(1), at 176.
88African Peace Protocol,supra note 2, art. 13(2), at 176.

89Id. art. 13(3)(a).
90 Id. art. 13(3)(b).

9,Id. art. 13(3)(c).
92Id. art. 13(3)(d), at 176-77.
9-African Peace Protocol,supra note 2, art. 13(3)(e).
94Id. art. 13(3)(f).
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[A]ny other functions as may be mandated by the Peace and
95
Security Council or the Assembly.

While undertaking these functions, the ASF is supposed to cooperate
with the U.N. and its agencies and other relevant international and regional
96
organizations, national authorities, and nongovernmental organizations.
The strategy and modus operandi for ASF missions will be approved by the
AUPSC on the recommendation of the AU Secretariat. 97 A Special
Representative of the Chairman of the Commission will head ASF missions, 98
and a Force Commander, who will report to the Special Representative, 99 will
coordinate and direct ASF operations. 100 The AUPSC Protocol also provides
for a Military Staff Committee that will provide military and security-related
advice to the AUPSC and liaise with the Force Commander. 10 1
Although on paper the lines of authority are prescribed in the Protocol,
only time will determine whether the AUPSC will be able to deal with the
numerous and complex issues involved with managing peace operations, let
alone the heated geopolitical antagonisms that often surface in African
peacekeeping operations.

III. LIKELY IMPACT AND MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCKS
A. Likely Impact
This section considers the impact of the AUPSC Protocol once it enters
into force and the main stumbling blocks that will need to be addressed,
including transregional conflicts of law.
Although in operational terms it is too early to consider the impact of the
AUPSC Protocol on Africa's collective security landscape, it is not premature
to assess the efficacy of its proposed structure. There can be no question that
the AUPSC will, at least initially, suffer from the same resource and
logistical inadequacies as its predecessor, the OAU Central Organ/MCPMR.
The new AU law of intervention, which obligates it to forestall conflict, by
coercive means if necessary, presents enormous political, economic, and
logistical challenges, not to mention issues related to the rate and consistency
of intervention that will no doubt surface given the numerous protracted
conflicts that need intervention on the continent. For example, while the AU

95 Id. art. 13(3)(g).
96 Id.

art. 13(4).

97 Id. art. 13(5), at 176-77.
98

African Peace Protocol,supra note 2, art. 13(6).

99 Id. art. 13(7).
100

Id. art. 13(6), (7).

101Id. art. 13(8)-(12), at 177-78.
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sought to end the crisis in Burundi in 2002102 through preventive diplomacy
and peace observation missions, it wrestled with ways and ultimately did
very little to diffuse conflict in Liberia during the same period' 03-while the
latter country perhaps was in greater need of intervention.
From a structural standpoint, the AU's new collective security framework
will have greater longevity and legitimacy than prior OAU conflict
mechanisms because of its robust mandate to enforce peace-authority
lacking in those organizations that preceded it.104 Only nine years after the
institution of the OAU MCPMR, the mandate and approach that
underpinned its creation was overhauled with the adoption of the AUPSC
Protocol in July 2002. Again, this is partly due to the MCPMR's limited
mandate-it did not include conflict management or intervention-but also is
due to the impact of conflict on African development generally. 10 5 African
leaders also seem to recognize that new solutions are necessary to curb the
devastating effects of civil conflict on African people, and that sovereignty is
no longer a shield from intervention when human suffering exists on a great
scale. As Nsongurua Udombana rightly points out:
The OAU Central Organ sanctioned many observer missions
and neutral investigations during the past decade with the
intention of moving towards a larger U.N. mission as well as
to demonstrate an African commitment commensurate with
that of the United Nations. But where has all this left Africa?
Today, more than a dozen conflicts, both old and new, still
ravage the continent, a clear indication that current methods
do not sufficiently tackle the problems. Is it not time to try
10 6
other solutions?
The AUPSC is another solution. African leaders have consciously and
willingly contracted away sovereignty for greater aspirations of peace,
security, stability, and development. Such a course of action was not
imaginable a decade ago.
The AU's proposed collective security framework is more democratic,
transparent, and inclusive than that of its predecessor. Under the AUPSC
102Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Situation in Burundi, U.N.

SCOR, S/2002/1259, at 1 (Nov. 18, 2002), available at http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N02/697/17/pdf/N0269717.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
103Jeremy Levitt, It's Time America Comes to Liberia'sAssistance, CHI. SUN TIMES, June 6, 2003,

at 27A, available at http://www.suntimes.com/output/otherviews/cst-edt-refO6.html.
104The OAU Central Organ only permitted and equipped the MCPMR to launch non-military
peace observation missions.
105"[O]nce started, civil wars retard economic and social development and aggravate povertycompleting the vicious circle of conflict poverty, and exclusionary politics." THE WORLD BANK,
CAN AFRICA CLAiM THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? 58 (2000).
106Nsongurua J. Udombana, Can the Leopard Change its Spots? The African Union Treaty and
Human Rights, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1177, 1224 (2002) (emphasis added).

TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 13:109

framework, the regional conflict mechanisms of regional bodies such as
ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD "are part of the overall security architecture of
the Union."'10 7 In this context, the AU commits itself to "harmonize and
coordinate" and partner with regional mechanisms to achieve peace, 108
security, and stability on the continent through the exchange of information
and analyses, 109 and the establishment of "liaison offices" in the regional
mechanisms. 110 It also seeks to work more closely with the U.N., particularly
the UNSC, and other international organizations in the "promotion and
maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa.""' Better cooperation
among African conflict mechanisms and between the UNSC and the AU
should fast-track African crises on the U.N. agenda-which may result in
more concerted action.
State actors are not the only beneficiaries of the AU's new security
framework. The Pan-African Parliament has gained a type of quasi-oversight
function over the AUPSC, requiring the latter to "maintain close working
relations with the Pan[-]African Parliament;" 11 2 submit reports to the former
on request, including a separate annual report on the "state of peace and
security in the continent;" 113 and "facilitate the exercise by the Pan-African
Parliament of its powers" under the Protocol to the Treaty establishing the
African Economic Community. 114 The AUPSC also will "seek close
cooperation" with the African Commission on Human and People's Rights
(Commission) in all matters relevant to its objectives and mandate." The
Commission will notify the AUPSC of any information relevant to its
objectives and mandate.115 The recognition of the Commission in the AUPSC
Protocol is an important development because it recognizes and codifies the
link between conflict, human rights violations, and intervention in the law
jus ad bellum and regional security policy in Africa. Another important
aspect of the AUPSC framework is its commitment to engage with civil
society organizations-and the obligation of the AUPSC to "encourage non-

107African Peace Protocol, supra note 2, art. 16(1), at 180.
108

Id. art. 16(1)(a).

109Id.

art. 16(4).

110Id. art. 16(8), at 180-81. Regional mechanisms are also "encouraged" to establish liaison
offices at the Commission. Id.
111Id. art. 17(1), at 181.

112 African Peace Protocol,supra note 2, art. 18(1), at 182.
113Id. art. 18(3).
114 Id. art. 18(3). One of the key objectives of the Pan-African Parliament is to "promote peace,
security and stability" throughout Africa. Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African
Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament, Mar. 2, 2002, art. 3(5), available
at http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity-to-union/pdfs/oau/treaties/pap-protocol.pdf (last visited
Nov. 28, 2003).
11 African Peace Protocol, supra note 2, art. 19, at 182. Yet it is unclear how and in what form
the Commission will "bring to the attention" relevant information to the AUPSC.

Spring 2003]

PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE AFRICAN UNION

125

governmental organizations" and any other type of "community-based"
organizations, "particularly women's organizations, to participate actively in
the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa." 116 The
recognition of the importance of civil society actors in the AUPSC Protocol is
a progressive development considering that African governments historically
have been very wary of them. Taken together, the inclusive approach to
conflict management outlined in the AUPSC Protocol may enable it to more
easily promote and build institutional trust among stakeholders during
conflict, including combatants, the AU, the U.N., regional conflict
mechanisms, and civil society institutions.
However, before the AUPSC can function efficiently, it will need to
address several structural faults. The major structural impediments needing
urgent attention concern regional conflicts of law between the U.N. and the
AU on one hand, and among African regional organizations and the AU on
the other.
B. AU/ U.N. Stumbling Blocks
The major stumbling blocks that have gone virtually unnoticed by the AU
leadership concern conflicts of law between the AU and the U.N. on the law
jus ad bellum. This section will examine two sets of stumbling blocks between
the organizations.
The first stumbling blocks between the AU and the U.N. arise within the
AUPSC Protocol. Under Article 16 the AUPSC devolves to itself the "primary
responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa,"11 7 but in
Article 17 it commits itself to "cooperate and work closely" with the UNSC,
seemingly recognizing that the UNSC "has the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security."' 18 These provisions are
somewhat contradictory; it is not clear whether the AU has reserved for itself
primary responsibility for peace and security in Africa rather than leaving it
to the UNSC. Notwithstanding, nothing in the AU Constitutive Act or in the
AUPSC Protocol explicitly requires the AU to seek prior authorization from
the UNSC before authorizing or launching interventions. 1 9 The decision not
to include such language in the Protocol, according to a senior AU official,
"was a conscious decision by AU leaders due to the debacles in Somalia and
Rwanda so the Assembly decided not to bind themselves to rules and systems
116 Id. art. 20. Civil society organization may even be invited to address the PSC.

117Id. art. 16(1), at 180 (emphasis added).
118 Id. art. 17(1), at 181. Article 24 of the U.N. Charter stipulates that "[i]n order to ensure
prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf." U.N.
CHARTER, art. 24.
119 This is in stark contrast with SADC law, which requires UNSC authorization before

embarking on peacekeeping operations. See discussion infra Part III.c-d.
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that have failed Africa, or the policy prescriptions of certain powers."' 120
Although AU leaders recognize that in an ideal world the UNSC should take
primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security in
Africa, the U.N.'s peacemaking record on the continent has been shamefully
poor, particularly with respect to the permanent members of the UNSC.121
Hence, interestingly, Article 17(2) of the AUPSC Protocol, which deals with
the relationship between the AU and U.N., states:
Where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations
to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military
support for the African Unions' activities in the promotion
and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in
keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the U.N.
122
Charter ....
Although Article 53(1) of the Charter requires that "no enforcement
action shall be taken under regional arrangements . . . without the
authorization of the Security Council,"'123 the AU does not directly
acknowledge this provision and obligation, but rather acknowledges Chapter
VII as a whole. Taken together, Articles 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act 1 24
and Articles 4(j) and (k),125 6(d),126 7(c)-(g), 127 16(1),128 and 17(1) and (2) of the
AUPSC Protoco' 29 reveal that while the AU acknowledges the "primary" role
of the U.N. in maintaining international peace and security, 130 particularly in
Africa, it reserves the right to authorize interventions in Africa-seeking
131
U.N. involvement "[w]here necessary."'
The pro-intervention language in the AU Constitutive Act and AUPSC
presents a dilemma because they arguably conflict with Articles 2(4) and
Telephone Interview with AU Officer, Office of the Legal Counsel, The African Union (Feb. 4,
2003) [hereinafter Telephone Interview].
121 The failure of the U.N. to forestall conflict in Liberia (1990), Sierra Leone (1997), Central
African Republic (1997), Guinea-Bissau (1998), Lesotho (1998), Congo (1998), Guinea (1999),
C6te d'Ivoire (2003), and Liberia (2003) are just a few examples.
122African Peace Protocol,supra note 2, art. 17(2), at 181 (emphasis added).
120

123U.N. CHARTER, supra note 118, art. 53(1), at 19.
124Constitutive Act, supra note 11, art. 4(h)-(j).
125

African Peace Protocol, supra note 2, art. 40)-(k), at 167.

126 Id. art. 6(d), at 168.
127M
Id. art. 7(c)-(g), at 169.
128 Id. art. 16(1), at 180.
129

Id. art. 17(1)-(2), at 181.

130African Peace Protocol, supra note 2, art. 17(1), at 181.
131 Id.
art. 17(2). Here, the AU seems to view Article 52 of the U.N. Charter as an independent
provision unhindered by the "pre-authorization" requirement in Article 53. It also appears to
reserve the right to be the sole arbiter of authorizing interventions vis-A-vis other African conflict
mechanisms and states. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 118, arts. 52-53.
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53(1) of the U.N. Charter.132 This places both AU instruments in conflict with
U.N. Charter Article 103, which states that "[i]n the event of a conflict
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the
present Charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter prevail."'133 On the
issue of regional intervention and Article 103, Rudolf Bernhardt comments:
[I]f the members of a regional arrangement, or even two
States, agree that in case of internal disturbances or other
events within one of the States concerned, the other State(s)
can intervene with military forces without the consent of the
de jure or de facto government, the compatibility of such a
special agreement [e.g., AU Constitutive Act and AUPSC
Protocol] with the Charter becomes doubtful and must in
principle be denied. Here, the territorial integrity of all States
and the prohibition of the use of force are at stake. An
agreement permitting forceful intervention would hardly be
compatible with the Charter and would fall under Article
103.134
While Bernhardt may be correct in doubting the compatibility of regional
intervention agreements or provisions with the U.N. Charter, this does not
necessarily mean that they are not lawful or valid, nor does it mean that they
must in principle be voided or suspended in whole or in part. This is true
because African state practice and the resulting intervention-based treaty
law developments-particularly Articles 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act
and the AUPSC Protocol-are not in fact inconsistent with the Charter's
schemata. Both instruments recognize the primacy of the U.N. in
maintaining international peace and security, and both reinforce its core
mission: keeping international peace through regional action in accordance
with Article 52 of the Charter. Furthermore, acting under its Chapter VII
powers, the UNSC has retroactively authorized African regional
interventions taken under the authority of hardened regional customary law
that has been codified into treaty. 135 In this sense, the conflicting African
132Article 2(4) requires that "[aill members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER, supra
note 118, art. 2(4). Any such conflicts of law between AU law and Article 2(4) may be limited to
interstate conflict because intrastate conflict is arguably out of the reach of the Charter's
provision. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 80 (3d ed. 2002).
133U.N. CHARTER, supra note 118, art. 103. Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties also recognizes the supremacy of Article 103 of the U.N. Charter. Vienna Convention,
supra note 22, at 93.
134RUDOLF BERNHARDT, Article 103, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY

1297 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) (emphasis added).
135The retroactive authorizations of ECOWAS to restore peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone
through, among others, UNSC resolutions 788, 866, and 1132, respectively, are cases in point.
See generally, African Interventionist States, supra note 19. Moreover, it can be argued that
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interventionist treaty law indefinitely prevails over Article 103 and
dependent provisions. Article 103 seems to create an exception for African
interventionist treaties136-to argue otherwise is to assert that the UNSC
violated Article 103 by authorizing ex post facto interventions prohibited
under Article 103, a difficult claim to make given the broad discretionary
powers of the UNSC. Furthermore, the AU's position fills a gap in U.N. law
and complements Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter concerning U.N.
involvement in intrastate conflicts, in which the framers of the U.N. did not
envisage the organization involving itself. The Charter explicitly prohibits
the organization from intervening in "matters that are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state" without prejudicing the "application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII."137
The approach taken by the AU is in accord with customary international
law use of force developments, namely, the hardening and mainstreaming of
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention into treaty law and the wider
corpus of international law. In the post-Cold War era, this doctrine has
largely been generated from African state practice (see Tables 1 and 2)138;
UNSC's ratification of African interventions; 13 9 and military action taken by
the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) in Kosovo in 1999.140

nothing in the traveaux prgparatoiresof Article 103 indicates that it applies to codifactory as
opposed to legislative treaties.
136 The same logic or analysis applies to ECOWAS law.
137U.N. CHARTER, supra note 118, art. 2(7), at 6-7.
138 The ECOWAS interventions in Liberia (1990-1997), Sierra Leone (1997-2000), Guinea (2000),

Guinea-Bissau (2001), and CMte d'Ivoire (2002); SADC intervention in Lesotho (1998); and
MISAB and CEMAC interventions in the Central African Republic in 1996 and 2003,
respectively.
139See generally HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 19; African Interventionist States, supra
note 19.
140Dino Kritsiotis, The Kosovo Crisis and NATO's Application of Force Against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 49 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 330 (2000).
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Selected African Military Interventions, 1990-2003

Group141

Place of Intervention

Year of
Intervention

Length of
Mission*

ECOMOG
MISAB
ECOMOG
ECOMOG
SADC
ECOMOG

Liberia
Central African Republic (CAR)
Sierra Leone
Guinea-Bissau
Lesotho
C6te d'Ivoire

1990
1997
1997
1998
1998
2003

8 years
9 months
2 years
1 year
1 month
ongoing

* These are conservative estimates because the ECOWAS and MISAB missions were later
converted into U.N.-sanctioned operations.

Table 2

Non-Humanitarian Legal Forcible Military
Interventions by Individual African States

State

Place of Intervention

Year of
Intervention

Length of
Mission

Nigeria
Senegal
Guinea

Sierra Leone
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau

1997
1998
1998

3 months
6 months
6 months

These interventions have solidified and further evolved the law jus ad
bellum, which the AU has codified in the Constitutive Act and the AUPSC
Protocol.
The second set of stumbling blocks is found in the differing laws of
intervention prescribed in AU and U.N. Charter law and customary
international law.
Under U.N. law and general and customary international law, the threat
or use of force by a state or group of states in another state for purely
humanitarian purposes is unlawful and a breach of the target state's political
independence and territorial integrity, absent that state's consent or explicit
authorization from the UNSC.142 Many scholars consider intervention,
141The acronyms signify: Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring

Group (ECOMOG); Mission for the Implementation of the Bangui Agreement (MISAB); Nigerian
Forces Assistance Group (NIFAG); and South African Development Community (SADC).
142See generally L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 134, 305 (Laughterpacht ed., 8th ed.
1955); Ulrich Beyerlin, Humanitarian Intervention, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
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regardless of its humanitarian motives, taken outside of these parameters to
be unlawful. 143 This is largely because, until recently, states have strictly
interpreted and adhered to the international law doctrine of state sovereignty
and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. On this
point, Dino Kritsiotis states:
Constructed as a basic legal proposition, the right of
humanitarian intervention-that
is, the transnational
application of force by states under the banner of
humanitarian concern-challenges the fundamental doctrine
upon which the contemporary system of international law
operates: the doctrine of state sovereignty and the
concomitant principle of non-intervention in the internal
44
affairs of states.1
Notwithstanding, those who subscribe to the non-interventionist position
are at a loss to explain the UNSC's retroactive authorizations of a wave of
seemingly illegal humanitarian interventions that have taken place since the
45
end of the Cold War. 1
As mentioned, Articles 4(h) and (j) of the AU Constitutive Act and
Articles 7(e) and (f), among others, of the AUPSC Protocol explicitly empower
the AU Assembly to launch and authorize humanitarian interventions. 146 In
contrast, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter forbids states in their "international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the U.N."'147 In this context, AU and U.N. law seem to
conflict. As Yoram Dinstein aptly points out, "the use or threat of force is
abolished in Article 2(4) only in the 'international relations' of Member
States. Intra-State clashes therefore are out of the reach of the Charter's
provision."' 148 In the present author's view, the AU and other African regional
organizations may lawfully employ force in states to forestall intrastate
conflict for two reasons: (1) because general and regional customary
international law and treaty law developments permit it, and (2) because

INTERNATIONAL LAw 211, 212 (Rudolph Dolzer et al. eds., 1982); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963); Roselyn Higgins, Peace and Security
Achievements and Failures, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 445 (1995); John Quigley, The 'Privatisation"of
Security Council Enforcement Action: A Threat to Multilateralism, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 249, 24950 (1995-96).
143Id.

144Dino Kritsiotis, Reappraising Policy Objections to HumanitarianIntervention, 19 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 1005 (1998).
145

The ECOWAS interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau are cases in point.

146The law of ECOWAS maintains a similar position. ECOWAS Protocol, supra note 3, art. 25, at
274.
147 U.N.

CHARTER, supra note 118, art. 2(4).

148 DINSTEIN,

supra note 132, at 80.
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such conflict arguably falls outside of the jurisdictional mandate of the U.N.,
149
and U.N. law does not forbid it.
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, Article 103 of the U.N. Charter
states that U.N. Charter law prevails when there is a "conflict between the
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter
and their obligations under any other international agreement."'150 The
aforementioned "conflict between obligations" is vital to ascertaining and
applying the law jus ad bellum and to pertinent wider international peace
and security policy considerations. A simple reading of Article 103 would
seem to resolve the issue-meaning that U.N. Charter law would prevail over
the interventionist provisions of AU law. Unfortunately, as demonstrated
above, the issue cannot be resolved so easily. AU law is not simply treaty law,
but rather codified regional and international custom; hence, the U.N.
Charter would not "prevail" because Article 103 does not apply to conflicts
between the U.N. and customary law. In fact, during the course of
deliberations over Article 103, "[a] formula according to which all other
commitments, including those arising under customary law, were to be
superceded by the Charter, was ultimately not included."'' 1 Apparently the
framers of Article 103 were not comfortable with it superceding conflicting
customary law developments.
The fact that the U.N. Charter is silent on the issue evidences the
framers' intent not to limit the legal efficacy of customary law developments.
Moreover, again, Article 103 is applicable only when there is a "conflict
between obligations," which cannot be found in this case, given the UNSC's
consistent pattern or practice of retroactively ratifying African
interventions,152 the majority of which were taken under the authority of
customary international law and pro-intervention treaties. How can there be
a conflict between obligations of AU and U.N. law under Article 103 when the
UNSC, the guarantor of breaches of international peace and security,
routinely ratifies under its Chapter VII powers African state practice that
otherwise creates conflicting obligations? 153 Richard Lauwaars argues that
the "only externally binding decisions are decisions of the Security Council
concerned with the maintenance of international peace and security. These
decisions clearly fall within the strictures of Article 103 and must be observed
149Although the U.N. does not forbid it, the author recognizes that it is debatable whether
intrastate conflict falls outside of the jurisdictional mandate of the UNSC, given the way in
which it has interpreted its discretionary powers and the language of Article 39 of the U.N.
Charter since the end of the Cold War. However, such interpretations also may be viewed as
exceptions to the general rule prohibiting such action.
150U.N. CHARTER, supra note 118, art. 103.
151BERNHARDT, supra note 134, at 1293.

152HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 19, at 373.
153Nothing in the U.N. Charter or the traveaux prdparatoiresof Article 103 addresses the issue
of consequences for breaches of the U.N. Charter: i.e., "whether incompatible agreements should
be void or merely suspended." BERNHARDT, supra note 134, at 1293.
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by Member States and international organizations.."154 If Lauwaars is correct
in asserting that UNSC decisions fall within the purview of Article 103 and
must be observed, then pro-interventionist African treaties (e.g., AU and
ECOWAS law) and resultant interventions sanctioned by the UNSC ex post
facto1 55 also must be observed rather than viewed in conflict with Article
103.156

This background supports an argument that the law of intervention in
the U.N. and the AU form two independent norms of international law, based
on the U.N. Charter on one hand and customary international law and treaty
law on the other. In principle, these norms compete and are juxtaposed,
creating normative friction, but in practice they have proven to be
complementary, 157 filling an alarming gap in the international system of
peace and security. Whatever the case may be, the U.N.'s poor peacemaking
record in Africa has been the greatest force in generating competing
customary law of intervention norms and pro-intervention treaties. Gross
deficiencies in the UNSC system have been the greatest corroder of U.N. law.
C. AUIECOWAS Stumbling Blocks
Serious stumbling blocks related to inter-African regional conflicts of law
exist among the AU, ECOWAS, and SADC that have not received adequate
attention by the AU.
As mentioned, the AUPSC had assigned itself primary responsibility for
promoting peace, security, and stability in Africa, 158 a designation that in the
jurisdictional sense supercedes any made by other African organizations.
Under Article 16 of the AUPSC Protocol, the organ "shall harmonize and
coordinate the activities of Regional Mechanisms in the field of peace,
security and stability to ensure that these activities are consistent with the
objectives and principlesof the Union."159 In this sense, the AUPSC has been
given a regulatory or quality control function vis-A-vis other regional
organizations and responsibility to "ensure effective partnership between
them and the Peace and Security Council in the promotion and maintenance
Richard H. Lauwaars, The InterrelationshipBetween United Nations Law and the Law of
Other InternationalOrganizations,82 MICH. L. REV. 1604, 1606 (1984).
154

155 The retroactive authorizations of ECOWAS to restore peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone
through, among others, UNSC resolutions 788, 866, and 1132, respectively.
156 It is also important to note that pro-intervention treaties and provisions should not be looked
at in isolation but rather in proximity to how they are employed in practice, particularly when
such practice is consistent with the U.N. Charter framework, namely, maintaining international
peace and security.
157 Again, the UNSC ex post facto authorization of and co-deployment with ECOWAS forces in
Liberia in 1992 through UNSC Res. 866 demonstrates this point. See The United Nations and
the Situation in Liberia, at 35, U.N. Doc. [ST/] DPI/1668 (LII Sess.) (1997).
158African
159

Peace Protocol, supra note 2, art. 16, at 180.

Id. art. 16(1)(a) (emphasis added).
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of peace, security and stability." 160 Yet there is some discord between the AU
and these regional mechanisms on the law jus ad bellum.
The laws of intervention in the AU and in ECOWAS are complementary.
The AU under both the AU Constitutive Act and the AUPSC Protocol may
authorize intervention to forestall war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide. Similarly, the ECOWAS-under both the Framework Establishing
the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peace-Keeping and Security (ECOWAS Framework) and the ECOWAS
Mechanism-may invoke a right of "humanitarian intervention" in three
cases: (1) in an internal conflict situation that "threatens to trigger a
humanitarian disaster" or "that poses a serious threat to peace and security
in the sub-region;" 161 (2) "in the event of a serious or massive violation of
human rights and the rule of law;" 162 and (3) "in the event of an overthrow or
attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government." 163 While both
the AU and ECOWAS have codified a right of intervention to forestall deadly
conflict and remedy large-scale human suffering with or without prior
authorization from the UNSC, the ECOWAS law goes further as it also
provides for a pro-democratic right of intervention.164 Although it is the policy
of the AU to condemn unconstitutional changes of government, 165 it provides
only for sanctions as a remedy, not military action. 66 It is unclear why the
AU Constitutive Act and the AUPSC Protocol do not provide a military
remedy for unconstitutional changes of government, especially since "respect
for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance"
are core underlining principles of AU law and vital for sustainable peace and
security on the continent. 167
Since coups in Africa typically are preceded or followed by breakdowns in
the rule of law and massive human rights violations, Article 7 of the AUPSC
Protocol, which empowers the AUPSC to "decide on any other issue having

160Id. art. 16(1)(b).

161ECOWAS Protocol, supra note 3, art. 25(a)-(b), at 274.
162Id. art. 25(b).
163 Id.

164African Interventionist States, supra note 19, at 41.
165 Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of
Government, OAU Doc. No. AHG/Decl.5 (July 12, 2000) (document on file with author). Under
the Declaration, the definition of situations that qualify as unconstitutional changes of
government are as follows: (1) "military coup d'etat against a democratically elected
government;" (2) "intervention by mercenaries to replace democratically elected Government;" (3)
"replacement of democratically elected Governments by armed dissident groups and rebel
movements;" and (4) "the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the
winning party after free, fair and regular elections." Id. This definition is far more expansive
than that of ECOWAS.
166
African Peace Protocol, supra note 2, art. 7(g), at 169.
167Constitutive Act, supra note 11, art. 4(m).
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implications for the maintenance of peace, security and stability on the
Continent,"'168 may provide it with the authority to authorize or employ force
to prevent or reverse unconstitutional changes of government. After all, this
is precisely what the OAU did in 1997, when it unequivocally condemned the
coup d'6tat of the Kabbah regime and "appeal[ed] to the leaders of ECOWAS
to assist the people of Sierra Leone to restore constitutional order to the
country" by reversing the coup. 169 Hence, there exists a concrete example of
the OAU sanctioning enforcement measures to forestall coups well before the
adoption of the AU Constitutive Act and the AUPSC Protocol.
D. AU/SADC Stumbling Blocks
The discussion that follows examines conflicts in the law jus ad bellum
between the AU and SADC. The law of SADC as prescribed in the SADC
Organ on Politics, Defense and Security 170 and the SADC Protocol on Politics,
Defense and Security Co-operation contradicts the law of AU and of
ECOWAS.1 71 SADC law permits, among other things, intervention to remedy
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, 72 and to forestall
military coups or other threats to legitimate authority, 173 but forbids any
such action absent prior authorizationfrom the UNSC. One of the guiding
principles of the SADC Organ is that "military intervention of whatever
nature shall be decided upon only after all possible political remedies have
been exhausted in accordance with the Charter of the OAU and the United
Nations."' 74 This essentially means that intervention may not take place in
contravention of U.N. law, namely, Article 53(1), barring enforcement action
"without the authorization of the Security Council." 175 This contention is
supported by Article 11(3)(d) of the SADC Protocol, which states that the
SADC Summit "shall resort to enforcement action only as a matter of last
resort and, in accordance with Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, only

168African Peace Protocol,supra note 2, art. 7(r), at 170.

169 Draft Organization of African Unity Council of Ministers, May 28-31, 1997, CM/Draft/Dec.
(LXVI) rev. 1, at 18.
170The SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security was adopted in Gaborone, Botswana, June
28, 1996. See generally, Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics,
Defense and Security (June 28, 1996), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON
CONSTITUTIVE, CONFLICT AND SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN, AND JUDICIAL ISSUES 323 (Jeremy I.

Levitt ed., 2003) [hereinafter SADC Organ].
171The SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-Operation was adopted in Blantyre,
Malawi, Aug. 14, 2001, but has yet to receive the necessary ratifications to come into force.
172 SADC Protocol,supra note 3, art. 11(2)(b)(i), at 317.
173 Id.

art. 11(2)(b)(ii). Article 11 also permits intervention to forestall any "conflict which
threatens peace and security in the Region or in another member state." Id. art. 11(2)(b)(iv).
174SADC Organ, supra note 170, princ. G, at 327.
175U.N. CHARTER, supra note 118, art. 53(1), at 19.
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with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council.1 76 As a result,
SADC may not "legally" partake in AU-sanctioned interventions (peace
enforcement) without UNSC approval. This fact is somewhat troubling
because the SADC Protocol, which was adopted over a year after the AU
Constitutive Act, did not make reference to or consider the law permitting
intervention in the treaty.
The legal, sociopolitical, and military implications of this conflict are
serious, especially considering the geopolitical sensitivities among African
states, which often are triggered by intervention and more nuanced security
policy considerations (e.g., heated debates between South Africa and
Zimbabwe over the standing of the SADC Organ). 177 Even so, the member
states of the AU have agreed to take "all necessary measures ... to implement
its provisions and to ensure the establishment of the organs [e.g., the
AUPSC] provided for under the Act .... ,"178 The member states of the SADC
form a critical block in the AU and are obliged to ensure that its principles
are adhered to, its objectives are fulfilled, and its provisions are abided by.
Therefore, AU law arguably should be considered supreme law trumping
inconsistent regional, national, and local law. The member states of the AUincluding the SADC-appear to have a positive duty to amend the laws of
their states and regional organizations to comply with AU law.
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS
African leaders must address the known unknowns about the AUPSC in
order for it to be a viable and credible conflict mechanism. While its aspiring
principles and operational objectives are indeed progressive, they are useless
absent the will to act by AU member states. While the AUPSC Protocol
complements and adds content and structure to the AU's New Partnership
for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Peace and Security and Democracy and
Political Governance initiatives, particularly its commitment to "manage all
aspects of conflict" through, among other things, "peacemaking, peacekeeping
and peace enforcement," 179 in order for it to serve its designated purpose-to
mitigate human suffering-it must be improved. The fact that African
leaders did not make provision for the OAU MCPMR or an AUPSC-like
mechanism in the Constitutive Act is unforgivable, considering that the
maintenance of peace and security and intervention in Africa are key
objectives18 0 and principles'8 1 of the Act.18 2 One analyst has noted that this

176SADC Protocol,supra note 3, art. 11(3)(d), at 317-18.
177SADC Organ, supra note 170, at 323-25.
178Constitutive Act, supra note 11, art. 33(3) (emphasis added).
179See NEPAD, supra note 8.

18oConstitutive Act, supra note 11, art. 3(0-(h).
181Id.

art. 4(h)-(f).
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omission may be due to the "haste with which the drafters [of the Act] had to
meet the impatient deadlines set by Libya .... ,"183 Whatever the case may be,
let us hope that the AUPSC is a suitable remedy for such an omission.
Another core problem with the AUPSC is that it was never formally
reviewed by a committee of legal experts,184 which may explain the blatant
conflicts of law and inconsistent terminology among the AU, ECOWAS, and
SADC. For example, the differences, if any, between the terms "intervention"
in AU law, 18 5 "humanitarian intervention" in ECOWAS law, and "peaceenforcement" in SADC law need to be worked out. This point is particularly
important since the AUPSC is mandated to promote cooperation and
coordinate and harmonize policy with regional organizations.1 8 6 Here there is
also a need for the AUPSC to lead the other regional organizations in
fashioning African peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and intervention
doctrine that is borne out of the African experience-the experiences of
ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and currently C6te d'Ivoire; MISAB in the Central
African Republic; and SADC in Lesotho. An African doctrine would provide a
basis on which AU member states could train and equip ASF-designated
forces, allowing for greater uniformity and perhaps operational preparedness.
On this issue, the establishment of AU liaison offices in or exchange of
staffers with the ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, and other regional conflict
mechanisms is critical.18 7 Had an AU office been set up in the ECOWAS, its
role in resolving the ongoing conflict in Liberia (1999-2003) may have been
more substantial-whether mobilizing resources, serving as a conduit
between the United States and ECOWAS on the precise role of the former in
resolving the crisis, or playing a greater role in diplomatic negotiations with
the warring factions. As it currently stands, what incentive does the
Nigerian-led ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) have to defer to the
policy prerogatives of the AU on the Liberian crisis or any other?18 8 While the
AU may lack the economic resources to respond rapidly to Africa's conflicts, it

182 Nsongurua

J. Udombana, The InstitutionalStructure of the African Union: A Legal Analysis,
33 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 69, 122 (2002).
183Jakkie

Cilliers, Commentary: Towards the African Union, AFR. SECURITY REV. 10-2 (2001), at
105, available at http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/lONo2/Cilliers.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2003).
184Telephone
185Neither

Interview, supra note 120.

the Constitutive Act nor the AUPSC Protocol defines "intervention."

186African Peace Protocol,supra note
187Id.

2, art. 16(1)(a), at 180.

art. 16(8), at 180-81.

188On

August 4, 2003, the first 200 of what will likely be a 2,000-person force landed in Monrovia
to keep the peace. LIBERIa" Nigerian Troops Arrive, Delay Entry into Monrovia, UNITED
NATIONS

INTEGRATED

REGIONAL

INFORMATION

NETWORK

(IRIN),

Aug.

4,

2003,

at

http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=35781&SelectRegion=West-Africa&SelectCountry
=LIBERIA (last visited Nov. 28, 2003). The AU's role in forestalling the conflict in the country
has been minimal--even as it relates to authorizing the intervention.
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still can play a significant political role-whether it is preventive diplomacy,
18 9
cease-fire monitoring, or authorizingintervention.
The member states of the African Union must move forward with
ratifying the AUPSC Protocol and, in the process, amend it to address the
aforementioned issues. The mere adoption of the AUPSC Protocol signals a
progressive shift and willingness by African leaders to at least in a minimal
fashion contract away state sovereignty for wider human and developmental
ends. 190 Unless the AU and its partners take a holistic, action-oriented
approach to ending the seemingly endless cycle of conflict throughout Africa
and seek practicable ways to remedy resulting devastating socioeconomic and
health impacts, particularly the violence against women and girls and the
HIV/AIDS pandemic, the human condition of the majority of Africans may
not be reversible and elements of the continent's sociopolitical architecture
may become extinct.

189Since the AU became operational in July 2002, it has not featured prominently in authorizing
uses of force in Africa.

Let us hope that the AUPSC Protocol is more welcomed than the Protocol on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, which seven years after its
adoption in 1997 has yet to receive the necessary ratifications to come into force. The following
states have signed and ratified the Protocol: Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Mali, Senegal, South
Africa and Uganda. Report of the Interim Chairpersonof the Commission of the Statues of AU
Treaties (as of Feb. 10, 2003), Executive Council, EX.CLI14 (II Sess.) (Mar. 3-6, 2003) (document
on file with author).
190

